Azerbaijan, Baku, 24 February /corr. Trend News D.Khatinoglu / The UN Security Council’s passing a new resolution against Iran may present obstacles to Tehran’s co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “ Iran may cease co-operation with the IAEA,” the US expert Mohsun Sazegara reported to Trend News.

On 22 February the IAEA Chairman Mohamed Al-Baredi submitted the report on Iran’s nuclear plans to the UN Security Council. The report highlights increase of Iran’s co-operation with the IAEA. The report says that Iran still refuses to make clear several key doubts. The permanent representatives of the UN Security Council devised the initial variant of the third Resolution against Tehran. Iranian officials stated that if any new sanctions are applied against the Country, they will sharply and seriously react to it.

The strong reaction of Iran can end its cooperation with IAEA and cause its refusal from Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sazegara told Trend by telephone from Washington on 23 February. “The new Resolution of the UN Security Council will impose embargo to Iranian banks Melli and Saderat, the Iranian officials will be banned to visit other countries and the goods imported to Iran will not be insured by foreign companies and they will not be provided with a credit guarantee. The sanctions imposed to Iran up to now inflicted huge damages to the country. If Iran will not fulfill the UN Security Council demands, it is not excluded that an embargo will be imposed on Iran’s oil industry,” he added.

Sazegara noted that the benefits and losses of Iran from nuclear plan are incomparable. “Irrespective of the statements made by the Country’s officials, there is uncertainty on the nuclear plan. The international community is seriously concerned by Iran’s continuing ballistic missile tests, threats of wiping Israel off the face of the earth and installation of new centrifuge on the nuclear station Natants,” Sazegara said.

Al-Baredi’s report on the Iranian nuclear program was positively assessed by the Iranian officials. “Golamhossein Elham, an Iranian official, positively treated IAEA’s recent report and noted that the peaceful purposes of Iran’s nuclear plan have again been confirmed,” IRNA quoted on 23 February. On the other hand, BBC cited the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who stated that Al-Baredi’s report reflected the danger of Iran’s secret nuclear program. In his report Al-Baredi noted that he was not completely certain about the peaceful purposes of the Iranian nuclear plan, but at the same time, he said that the official Teheran intensified its cooperation with IAEA.

http://news.trend.az/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1142726&lang=EN

Azerbaijan, Baku, 10 January / core Trend D.Khatinoglu / Despite the demands by the UN Security Council, Iran has not yet ceased the enrichment of uranium and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head’s visit to Tehran will be directed towards the resolution of this issue. The IAEA Secretary General’s visit to Iran is the last ultimatum for Tehran, Mohsen Sazegara, a US expert, stated in an interview for Trend.

On 12 Jan, Mohammad Albaradei, the Secretary General of the IAEA, will visit Iran. The UN Security Council demand Iran to halt the enrichment of uranium. In this respect, the two resolutions have been issued to Iran, but Iran did not stop its nuclear plan. Although 5+1 countries failed to come to a common ground, they are discussing the application of the third resolution with respect to Iran.

On 10 Jan, Sazegara stated in his telephonic interview for Trend from Washington that the Iranian nuclear program excited concerns both in the West and Arab countries. Over the last period, the United States gently treated Iran and it has excited concern in the United Arab Emirates, which fears that the United States might make any compromises for the nuclear issue and that might contradict Arabs’ interests. “The US President’s visit to the region targets promising Arabs, their security,” he said.

Sazegari said that the United States will not make any comprise with respect to Iran. “The United States will still try to apply the third resolution with respect to Iran and Albaradei’s visit to Iran is the last warning for this country,” Sazegara said.

The UN Security Council demanded Iran to cease the enrichment of uranium. However, Tehran still insists on its nuclear plan and considers the enrichment of uranium as its juridical right. So far, the UN Security Council has issued the two resolutions on Iran and at present the third resolution under the discussion.

Same interview in Russian and Azeri:
http://news.trend.az/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1109515&lang=RU
http://news.trend.az/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1109512&lang=AZ

WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States risks elevating tensions and is not likely to achieve much by declaring Iran's Revolutionary Guards a "terrorist" group, a prominent Iranian dissident who co-founded the Guards said.

Mohsen Sazegara, who was a high-ranking Tehran official before turning against the government, told AFP in an interview that the US move, reported to be in the works last week, could spark a backlash, stirring up more turmoil in places where Washington accuses them of terror activities, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon.

Now a research fellow on Iran at Harvard University, Sazegara also said that he doubted blacklisting the Revolutionary Guards would force any change in the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

"The relationship between Iran and the United States will go one more step ahead toward military confrontation and the situation will become more dangerous, because the Revolutionary Guards is now one of the most powerful organizations in the politics of Iran," he said.

Sazegara, 52, is in a unique position to know about the secretive group he describes as the most powerful institution in Iran.

He held high positions in the Tehran regime after the 1979 revolution, including a key role in setting up the Revolutionary Guards that year. He describes it as now a huge political force of its own.

"The Revolutionary Guard ... is at the same time a political party, it is like an army, a security organization, a secret service, a huge complex of companies."

Domestically, he said, they operate a militia, the Bassidj, for suppression. Outside the country, they operate through the Quds force, which is out of Ahmadinejad's control.

"This is a force that is involved in Iraq, or Lebanon, or Afghanistan, or Palestine, any place in the world," he said.

"Not only the foreign ministry of Iran; even the president does not know what the Revolutionary Guards does outside of Iran. They directly report to the leader," he said, referring to Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

He described the group as having built sweeping economic power since the 1990s. "They started to run several companies and right now many people believe that the Revolutionary Guards own more than 100 companies .... in general contracts of gas and oil, plants, extraction projects.

Under Khamenei, they pushed deeply into politics, playing a key role in Ahmadinejad's rise.

"Many of the members of cabinet and parliament are members of the Revolutionary Guards ... many of the top managers of the country are from the Revolutionary Guards."

Sazegara, who distanced himself from the government in 1989 and did four stints in jail for his activities as editor of a reformist journal, said there is room for some pressure on Iran.

"It's hard to say what is the main intention of the United States," he said, noting that a minority of the US leadership, including Vice President Dick Cheney, have threatened a military strike on the country.

"So far although we have had two resolutions of the UN Security Council, they are not strong resolutions, they don't go for the main sources of power of this regime.

"Whatever the United States has done solely is more effective. Striking the banking system is causing a lot of problems for the merchants and industries of Iran, in the private and public sectors."

However, he insisted, "blacklisting the Revolutionary Guards is not enough to push them to a reasonable policy."

"Everything must be solved by negotiations. But in any negotiation you have to show your power too. You have to show the carrots and the sticks, you have to show that you are serious too. Otherwise Iran just wastes time."

Sazegara, who left Iran and went to Harvard in 2005, said that the Guards themselves are not all that content with Ahmadinejad, and that international pressure over human rights could have an impact on his government.

"What (Iranians) expect from the international community is to put pressure on this regime to help the people of Iran in their struggle for democracy and human rights.

"Any sanction against Iran of course creates problems for the people. But the people of Iran are ready to tolerate the difficulties if they are sure that the international community goes toward a kind of Helsinki process, if they establish some link between the sanctions and the human rights and democratic issues in Iran."

By Philip Sherwell Aug 19, 2007

As the zealous enforcers of Iran's Islamic revolution, they are at pains to be seen living humbly, maintaining homes in the crumbling Soviet-style slums of downtown Teheran and driving modest, imported Korean cars.

But for many commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, the force allegedly responsible for ordering attacks on British and US forces in Iraq, life is rather more luxurious than they want it to appear.

Behind the façade of a simple, pious existence, they live in mansions in the exclusive hills of northern Teheran with the latest model of BMW or Mercedes Benz in the garage, luxury hand-woven rugs on the floor, wardrobes full of designer clothes and a safe packed with diamond and gold jewellery.

Such men have grown rich as the Guards have extended their role from imposing religious rectitude at home and exporting Iran's revolution, to playing a huge role in the country's economy. From the oil and gas industries to chicken farms and apiaries, the Guards have used their power and muscle to take control of major areas of business in Iran.

Now, though, their burgeoning economic empire is the focus of White House moves to classify the regime's 125,000-strong praetorian Guard as a "terrorist organisation".

Under plans disclosed last week, the Bush administration is expected to announce the classification in coming months in response to the Guards' alleged role in terror attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Iran's disputed nuclear programme.

The listing would allow the US to freeze or block bank accounts and business involved with the Guards, although the immediate impact would be limited as the US already has an almost complete trade embargo on Iran. But the designation could be more than symbolic if US diplomats can encourage European states and companies to follow suit by persuading them that trade with Iran is effectively trade with the Guards.
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General Yahya Rahim Safavi, the leader of the Guards, responded defiantly yesterday. "America will receive a heavier punch from the Guards in the future," he said. "We will never remain silent in the face of US pressure and we will use our leverage against them."

Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, himself a former Guards commander, the organisation has aggressively expanded its business empire as part of his strategy of placing hardliners in key positions of power.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran, the exile opposition movement which revealed the existence of Iran's secret nuclear programme in 2002, has tracked the explosion of the Guards' economic operations. "The country's economy and politics is now under the command of veteran Guards commanders and senior officials of the security and intelligence apparatus," it concludes in a dossier on the Guards' activities.

Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the council, which Iran itself regards as a terrorist organisation, said: "The designation of the Guards will have been long overdue. The UK and EU should adopt similar measures without delay."

Teheran would doubtless counter that the council's armed wing is itself listed as a terror organisation by the US - the council's supporters claim that designation was made as a bargaining chip when the Clinton administration attempted rapprochement with Iran.

One former Guards commander to have benefited is Sadeq Mahsouli, 47, an Ahmadinejad confidant. He spent much of his career in the military and security apparatus before using his guards contacts and credentials to build a business in construction and oil trading.

Indeed, when he was nominated to be oil minister in 2005, his wealth even raised opposition in the parliament, where one legislator called him a "billionaire general". Mr Mahsouli acknowledged he was a rich man but was quoted by the state-run newspaper Hammiyan as saying: "What Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] has prohibited is the attitude and demeanour of living in palaces, not living in palaces itself."

They may not technically be palaces, but his six mansions and estates are estimated to be worth £10 million while his total worth could be as much as £86 million, according to Iranian media reports.

Several Iranian businessmen, speaking anonymously, have detailed how the Guards have used force and intimidation to grab business. "If you enter the economy using a gun and handcuffs, it is much easier to deal with competitors and to win the most lucrative contracts," said Mohsen Sazegara, who co-founded the organisation in 1979 but then turned against the regime and was jailed before going into exile in America in 2003.

He claimed the Guards had turned into a "corrupting" and "mafia-like" organisation, which was heavily involved in smuggling goods for the thriving black market. These include alcohol, which is supposedly forbidden but is widely consumed at private parties frequented by the Iranian elite. Much of the smuggling is done through Guards-controlled airports.

Even as Teheran suffers an economic slump, which is undermining Mr Ahmadinejad's popularity, jewellery boutiques and luxury furniture are doing a booming trade thanks partly to patronage from the Guards, who have also been investing heavily in property.

The real "fat cats", however, are funnelling their money abroad into the Gulf states, most notably Dubai. Such investment could also provide a foreign bolthole if the regime falters in the future.

By Ruth Walker
Special to Harvard News Office

Iranian rights activist and HLS fellow Mohsen Sazegara (above right): ‘[T]here is no way to have human rights ... unless you come out and redefine the human being, and accept modern rationality and modern reason.’ Fellow Mehrangiz Kar (above left) listens.
Staff file photo Stephanie Mitchell/Harvard News Office

“Iran has a constitution and specific laws that on closer scrutiny turn out not to be laws at all, because they can be interpreted in any way to the advantage of the rulers.”

That is the judgment on his homeland that Mohsen Sazegara, Iranian human rights activist and now a fellow at Harvard Law School, presented Friday (April 27).

He went on, “The rulers can undertake any transgression against the rights of citizens and against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the guise of upholding the law.”

Sazegara spoke at a conference sponsored by the University Committee on Human Rights Studies to explore the current state of human rights in Iran. He and other presenters gave a very dark picture. It wasn’t without some significant silver linings, though — even at a time of heightened tensions between Washington and Tehran that put activists within Iran in a precarious position.

Sazegara also articulated what Stephen Marks, Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights in the Faculty of Public Health and the organizer of the conference, called “the profound issue of the fundamental incompatibility of Islam, as interpreted by the Islamic Republic, and human rights.”

To make Islamic law compatible with international human rights would take nothing less than “redefining what it means to be human,” asserted Sazegara, who initially supported the Islamic revolution but soon became disillusioned and who has spent several years in prison as a result.

In an Islamic state, he said, “there is no way to have human rights, a standard of human rights, unless you come out and redefine the human being, and accept modern rationality and modern reason, and then you will have another sharia.”

This isn’t a problem only in Iran, Sazegara said. The new constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan, he noted pointedly, insist that no law can be made in conflict with Islamic law.

Without such a rethinking and a coming to terms with modernity, Sazegara said, Islamic law “means they have to execute anyone who converts his religion from Islam; they can’t have any equality for men and women; it means they have to stone everyone who commits adultery.”

Despite this grim analysis, several of the eight presenters identified grounds for hope and practical approaches to engaging the government for positive change.

Hadi Ghaemi of Human Rights Watch described several branches of Iranian civil society as fairly active — notably women’s rights organizations, writers’ and journalists’ organizations, and a resurgent labor movement.

The position of women is more advanced than a straight reading of the law would suggest, he said. And women are better off trying to redress specific grievances — under-representation in the universities, for instance, given that 65 percent of those who pass entrance exams are women — than defending “human rights” in the abstract.

Iran is a member of or signatory to a number of different international organizations or conventions, and several presenters suggested that these could provide useful channels.

At the end of the conference, Marks identified several “areas where our energies could be applied” to further the cause of human rights in Iran:

• Harvard support for “tamizdat” publishing for the Iranian expatriate
  community. A takeoff on “samizdat,” the self-publishing of the former Soviet
  bloc, “tamizdat” is “publishing over there, ‘on the outside.’” The idea is
  that writing published this way would eventually seep back into Iran itself.
  One particular theme: rethinking the compatibility of human rights and
  Islam.


• Use of the channels provided by Iran’s ratification of the U.N.
  Convention Against Discrimination in Education to lodge protests and file
  grievances. “There might be some traction to be made there,” Marks said,
  adding that Iranian participation in UNESCO also provides similar channels
  in the scientific and cultural realm.


• Use of channels provided by Iran’s participation in the ILO and the
  Convention on Rights of the Child.


• A media campaign within the United States to urge a return to diplomatic
  relations with Iran, to get the ear of the foreign policy advisers of the
  various presidential candidates, and above all to make plain that U.S.
  government support for Iranian human rights activists is the kiss of death.
  


• Efforts to reach out to non-Western organizations. Marks said while he
  did not expect governments of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to
  turn against Iran, “There are other ways to broaden the message to human
  rights organizations that are not so clearly identified with their
  headquarters in New York or London or Paris.”
  

Recent events in the Middle East have put the spotlight on Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Guard naval units seized 15 British service personnel in the waters of the Persian Gulf last month, and Revolutionary Guard agents have been accused of aiding insurgents and terrorist groups in Iraq and Lebanon. VOA correspondent Gary Thomas gives us a look at the Revolutionary Guard and its role inside and outside Iran.

According to Western analysts, the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) runs businesses, maintains its own ground and sea forces separate from the regular army and navy, mounts foreign and domestic intelligence operations, and has become a major player on Iran's political landscape.

The Revolutionary Guard was born in the tumult surrounding the Islamic Revolution 28 years ago. Mohsen Sazegara, who accompanied Ayatollah Khomeini on his return to Iran in 1979, said the new revolutionary government did not entirely trust the regular armed forces, and also feared attack from the United States. So, Sazegara says, he was given the task of forming a kind of people's militia to protect the revolution.

"I remember, in those days, I studied the model of the National Guard of the United States, the Swiss Army, the peoples' army of Switzerland, and the army of Israel and the Viet Cong in Vietnam - the models of how we can mobilize the ordinary people to defend the country - in any case, to help the regular army of the country," he said.

After Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980, poorly armed, but fiercely zealous Revolutionary Guard units threw themselves in the front lines of attack. In the years following, the Revolutionary Guard grew into a highly disciplined and deeply ideological military force. Many analysts estimate the guards number about 125,000 in air, land, sea and intelligence units.

Mohsen Sazegara left Iran in 2003, after being imprisoned for dissident views. He now lectures at Harvard University. He says the Revolutionary Guard's power has grown enormously, and it now dabbles in politics and gets lucrative business contracts from the government.

"Now, the Revolutionary Guard has been converted into a kind of organization, a kind of government inside the government of Iran,” he noted. “They are like the KGB, because they have a secret service, as well. They are like the Red Army, they are like the Communist Party, and they are like a complex of companies, as well."

The current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is a Guard veteran of the Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts attribute his 2005 election to active intercession by the Basiij, the nearly one-million-person strong domestic volunteer militia under Guard control. It is known for enforcing ideological purity. One analyst likens the Basiij to the Red Guard in the days of Mao Zedong's China.

But Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says Ahmadinejad's past ties with the Guard do not necessarily mean he controls it.

"The Revolutionary Guards are increasingly a very powerful force in Iran,” he explained. “They have tremendous economic interests and assets. They are very active on the political scene, and they are essentially running Iranian activities in Lebanon and Iraq. But Revolutionary Guards are under the constitutional authority of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei."

The Guard's foreign operations arm is known as the Quds force. U.S. Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, says Quds force agents provide training and arms, including deadly roadside bombs, to Iraqi insurgents to attack U.S. forces.

"I would say, though, it is clear that they continue to interfere, the Quds Force continues to attempt to interfere in Iraqi, in operations inside of Iraq,” he said. “We continue to intercept weapons. We know there's money that's flowing in from Iran to certain insurgent groups in Iraq, and we will continue to work through this."

In January, U.S. forces detained five Iranians in northern Iraq. The U.S. says they are Quds force operatives; Iran says they are diplomats. Many analysts believe the U.S. detention of the Iranians was at least one cause of the Iranian seizure of the British sailors.

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Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was once a member of his country's Revolutionary Guard, the force that recently captured 15 British sailors in the waters between Iran and Iraq.

Before announcing the Britons' release Wednesday, Ahmadinejad pinned a medal of bravery to the chest of the Revolutionary Guard commander who oversaw their capture.

Analyst Bruce Reidel was a CIA officer focused on Iran when the Revolutionary Guard established itself as a major force.

"The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was formed in May 1979, almost immediately after the revolution," Reidel said. "It was set up by the then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to be the guardian of the revolution."

Now associated with the Brookings Institutions Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Reidel says the ayatollah wanted protection against threats by Iran's regular army, loyal to the previous government, and foreign intelligence agencies, like the CIA.

"Iranian's had a vivid memory of 1953, when a coup had been launched against a much-less revolutionary government … and put the shah back in power," Reidel said. "I think you can effectively characterize them [the Revolutionary Guard] as the hardliners within the Islamic Republic."

Mohsen Sazegara helped found the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and says the group was originally intended to be a popular force like the Swiss army, the National Guard in the United States or Vietnam's Viet Cong.

"The Revolutionary Guard was supposed to be a people's army," Sazegara said. "It was supposed to mobilize the people of Iran in front of any foreign attacks to Iran."

In 1980, when Iran and Iraq went to war, the Revolutionary Guard acted as human waves in some of the toughest battles. Hundreds of thousands of fighters perished.

At the same time, the Guard began to export the ideals of the revolution throughout the Middle East. The Quds Brigade acted as its external affairs branch, helping set up Hezbollah and developing other ties with Shia extremist groups.

"The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, for more than 25 years, has been involved in shipping weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including [the] missiles used against Israeli cities last summer," analyst Reidel said. "They've also been involved in shipping arms to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian occupied territories."

Former Revolutionary Guard leader Sazegara says he became disillusioned with the organization as they gained more power within Iran. What bothered him most, he says, was when the Revolutionary Guard turned its attention to making money.

"The Revolutionary Guard started to intervene in economic and financial affairs in Iran," Sazegara said. "And, gradually, they have established about 100 companies all around the country, in construction, in trading, in manufacturing

"And now, the Revolutionary Guard is something really strange. It's an organization which is like a political party because they have 80 seats in the parliament, they have more than half of the members of the cabinet. They are like the KGB because they have secret services, and the act like that. And they are like a cartel or trust."

Sazegara, now a visiting researcher at Harvard University, was imprisoned in Iran in 2003 for criticizing the government.

"You can call the Revolutionary Guard a kind of government inside the government of Iran," he said.

Mohsen Sazegara | Fri. Mar 16, 2007

Back in October 1978, none of us in exile with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini imagined that victory for the Islamic Revolution would be attained only a few months later. It was during those days in Neuf-le-Chateau that the notion of starting a “people’s army” first took hold, and expecting that our battle would be a long one, we took as models for our soon-to-be established army the forces in Algeria and Cuba.

But on February 1, 1979, we stepped off a plane from France into Tehran, and 10 days later we were in power. Suddenly we had a position to protect, and the model for our people’s army changed dramatically. It seemed more appropriate to emulate such forces as the Swiss Armed Forces, United States National Guard or Israel Defense Forces.

The thought was that if the Islamic Republic had two separate armies with independent command structures, the country could insulate itself against a coup. If ordinary citizens were given military training in preparation for combat, we believed, then any military commander would think twice before contemplating overthrowing the government.

In the three decades since, there has not been a coup. That people’s army, however, has grown into a multi-headed monster.

Today the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution — known in Farsi as the Sepah-e Pasdaran and in English as the Revolutionary Guard — is a mafia-like organization with a corrupting influence on Iran’s army, police, media, industries, judiciary and government. It is imperative that every effort now be made to contain the Revolutionary Guard’s powers, because its political and economic adventurism will ultimately lead to a serious crisis, not just in Iran but also across the Middle East.

Any attempt at rolling back the Revolutionary Guard’s power must begin with an understanding of how it has strayed from its original mission.

In the first phase of planning, we envisioned three separate circles on the organizational chart. The first consisted of a small but varied cadre of at most 500 people who were to be permanently employed by the Revolutionary Guard. All command and staff positions, including all the trained personnel destined for senior command in guerilla warfare, were to come from this quarter.

The second circle was to consist of another group of around 500,000 people who were to be recruited on a volunteer or part-time basis from the general public, with a designated mission to serve as commanders of “civilian guerilla groups.” The third and final circle would encompass as many people as possible from all walks of life — students, workers, bureaucrats, farmers and the like. It was envisioned that each volunteer would receive military training and subsequently be invited to participate in at least one prearranged military exercise each year.

Although computers were not commonly used in those days, we nonetheless intended to make full use of computerized programming for the promotion of the new organization, under the direct supervision of one of the personnel working for me. The light weapons held in the various armories were to be re-registered and distributed around the country. In case of an emergency, our thinking went, a simple volunteer from anywhere in the land could serve under the command of a part-time, fully trained group leader, who in turn would be part of a Revolutionary Guard division under the command of a full-time, fully trained commander with a mission to protect the country and the revolution.

As originally planned, the Revolutionary Guard was to be, quite literally, a people’s army — not, as it has become, a force separate from the general public, let alone opposed to it. In times of war, the Revolutionary Guard was seen as a force to fight alongside the regular military in the service of the country. In times of peace, it was to tend to its own affairs. In times of need or natural disasters, it was to help out with civil defense and other emergency operations.

After the original plans for the Revolutionary Guard had been drawn up and its constitution finalized in April 1979, I relinquished my post in the organization’s information and research unit to Ali Mohammad Besharati. I moved on to National Iranian Radio and Television, where after a short while I was appointed to head radio operations.

The years since have taken me on a far different path than the one on which I began the Islamic Revolution, but having been involved with the Revolutionary Guard at its birth, I have continuously followed its evolution. It is my view that over the course of the past 28 years, the Revolutionary Guard has deviated from its original mission in three important ways, in the process inflicting a series of irreparable damages to Iran.

The first deviation began when Mohsen Rezai, Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr and their ilk entered the Revolutionary Guard. Their first major task was to convert the Revolutionary Guard’s information and research unit — which had originally been designed to serve as an analysis and planning unit with, at most, some residual capacity for military intelligence gathering — into an outright security organization with Rezai at its helm.

It didn’t take long for this intelligence unit to expand its influence over the Revolutionary Guard’s other units. In May 1982, Iranian armed forces expelled the occupying Iraqi army from the ravaged southern city of Khorramshahr. Before the Iraqis captured the city in October 1980, it had been a major international port with a wealthy, cosmopolitan population, and the Revolutionary Guard’s part in recapturing Khorramshahr quickly gained mythic status in Iran. The intelligence unit’s control over the Revolutionary Guard became near total, and it embarked on a mission to convert the Revolutionary Guard into a classic fighting machine.

After the battle for Khorramshahr, Iran held the upper hand over Iraq. But rather than pursue a cease-fire, these gentlemen — aided and abetted by then-parliament speaker Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — convinced Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that it was essential for Iranian military forces to invade Iraqi territory and capture the port city of Basra. There is no doubt that responsibility and blame for the six-year extension of the Iran-Iraq War, which needlessly caused so much death and destruction for the Iranian people, rests firmly on the shoulders of the clique of Revolutionary Guard commanders around Rezai and Zolghadr.

These same elements in the Revolutionary Guard, who assumed senior military titles for themselves without having the slightest relevant qualifications, unashamedly planned a number of large-scale offensives after the victory at Khorramshahr. As a consequence of Operations Khaybar, Badr, Karbala 4, Karbala 5 and others, thousands and thousands of young Iranians needlessly suffered. Of the nearly 267,000 Iranian deaths and 500,000 casualties caused by the Iran-Iraq War, more than 90% occurred after Khorramshahr was recaptured and the invading Iraqis expelled from Iranian territory.

In 1985, the Revolutionary Guard was able to obtain Khomeini’s approval for developing air, ground and naval units, thereby acquiring all the properties of a classic military organization. Despite lacking the necessary training and education, the Revolutionary Guard began to rival the regular armed forces.

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Revolutionary Guard’s commander, Rezai, stated that the Revolutionary Guard must develop units specifically tasked with confronting opposition to the regime. I met shortly afterward with the head of Iran’s Judiciary Branch and asked him not to pursue Rezai’s plan. The only possible outcome from such an act, I warned, would be the creation of a force very much resembling the Nazi Brownshirts.

The head of the Judiciary Branch laughingly disregarded my suggestion. I should not bad-mouth the Nazis, he told me; at least they had some educated people among them. In the end, Rezai had his way, and so were created the “White Shirts” and other civilian groups entrusted with the task of intimidating and brutalizing any hint of opposition, a practice that still takes place today.

The Revolutionary Guard was no longer a people’s army, just another coercive force at the service of the ruling establishment. To solidify their hold on power, the same clique that has been running the Revolutionary Guard all these years prematurely removed a number of senior and able commanders, among them Davoud Karimi, the commander in Tehran.

The Revolutionary Guard also expanded beyond the air, ground and naval components approved by Khomeini in 1985. The Basij force, which had been created as a volunteer militia to help fight the war with Iraq, was transformed into a unit with paid elements who were tasked with confronting domestic opposition. And in order to carry out the Revolutionary Guard’s bidding in areas outside the country — Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Egypt, Sudan and, most importantly, Iraq — the Quds Force was created.

I once heard Hassan Abbasi, who was a member of the Revolutionary Guard’s strategic planning department, boast to students at Khajeh Nasir University that the Revolutionary Guard was making good use of the Hezbollah cells it had created in Lebanon and elsewhere. And the current president of the Islamic Republic, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, served with the Ramazan Unit of the Quds Force, participating in Iraq-related operations during the during the Iran-Iraq War. There should be no doubt about the Quds Force’s role in what transpired last summer in Lebanon, or in what is happening on a daily basis between Shias and Sunnis in Iraq.

The Revolutionary Guard also set up a new secret intelligence unit under the auspices of the Judiciary Branch’s security section. In effect a parallel security organization, it operates under the direct supervision of the supreme leader.

The most notorious part of this secret intelligence organization is Prison 325, which the unit runs independently in Evin Prison. I, like other opposition elements, was imprisoned there.

The Revolutionary Guard’s second major deviation from its original mission took place over the course of Rafsanjani’s eight-year presidency. After becoming president in 1989, he made it a priority for all government agencies to increase their revenues. He incorporated into his plans the Revolutionary Guard and the Ministry of Information. These two organizations, armed with weapons and handcuffs, soon entered the world of business — and became an entity replicated in other parts of the world only by mafia-like gangs of criminals.

In the former Soviet Union the KGB occupied a similar position, and as a result, post-Soviet society is plagued by the Russian mafia, one of the world’s deadliest criminal organizations. To this day, these elements have a stranglehold on some of Russia’s key economic enterprises, which has allowed them to weigh in heavily on the general direction of the country’s politics.

In Iran as much as in Russia, when elements armed with weapons enter into commercial activities, two immediate and major threats are created. The first is that economic rivals are soon arrested or intimidated, and with rivals out of the equation, a commercial monopoly is inevitably established. Second, the armed economic unit, in an attempt to increase its easy profits, uses its power of intimidation and force to enter into a number of illegal activities, such as drug and alcohol smuggling and prostitution. Because of their weapons, no one dares challenge or criticize these elements’ behavior.

After Mohammad Khatami assumed the presidency in 1997, serious attempts were made to extricate Iran’s intelligence community from the world of conventional economic activities. Intelligence Minister Ali Younesi himself insisted on the effort. By most accounts, some moderate progress was achieved, but a number of people remain skeptical about the sincerity with which the effort was pursued.

However, as regards the Revolutionary Guard — which still operates under the direct supervision of the supreme leader — no such steps were ever initiated. Indeed, its involvement in commercial activities has only grown.

Today the Revolutionary Guard controls more than 100 different economic enterprises, conducting business under the aegis of either itself or the Basij. Its commercial activities have ranged from importing household goods — at a time when other commercial enterprises were banned from importing some of those goods — to being in charge of car manufacturing companies and assembly plants.

The Revolutionary Guard has also been a major contractor in the construction of oil and gas pipelines, as well as in the importing of Kazakh oil into Iran. And when Iraq was under international sanction by the United Nations Security Council, the Revolutionary Guard was the prime force behind Iranian efforts to help Saddam Hussein and his family smuggle oil out of Iraq, according to personal acquaintances of mine who were involved in the operations.

Some Revolutionary Guard commanders are directly involved in economic activities aimed at enriching themselves. One case in point is Sadegh Mahsouli. Formerly the Revolutionary Guard commander of Azerbaijan province in northwest Iran, he was nominated by Ahmadinejad to the powerful post of oil minister, and would be serving today had the parliament not rejected his nomination.

And since Ahmadinejad moved into the president’s office, contracts for oil pipelines worth more than $7 billion have reportedly been awarded to Revolutionary Guard-affiliated enterprises without any public tenders, at a time when numerous contractors with far more experience and qualifications in their respective fields are struggling with serious financial problems.

Consequently, a government whose slogan and mission has been to fight financial corruption has inadvertently become what is undoubtedly the most corrupt government in the history of modern Iran.

The Revolutionary Guard’s third deviation from its original mission has taken place since Ali Khamenei became supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1989. By involving the Revolutionary Guard in the political life of the country, Khamenei’s direct and unwise leadership of the corps has simply exacerbated matters beyond imagination.

Before Khamenei assumed the mantle of leadership, ambitious Revolutionary Guard commanders who displayed an interest in entering into politics were severely reprimanded. Khomeini firmly believed that no military establishment should be allowed to involve itself in the political life of the nation.

Once Khamenei came into power, however, Khomeini’s restrictions were no longer adhered to, and political appointments of Revolutionary Guard members became quite regular. At the height of the reform movement under President Mohammad Khatami, Khamenei was instrumental in allowing a number of key Revolutionary Guard and Basij members to enter into politics.

The appointments were part of a strategy aimed at safeguarding Khamenei’s own position of power, which was threatened by a clear absence of popular support. When the media publicly questioned the lethal mix of military and politics under Khamenei, the reaction was quick and venomous — and I speak from personal experience.

In 1999, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Rahim Safavi, gave a public speech in which he attacked Jame-e, a reform-minded newspaper I co-founded, and warned of “snakes and scorpions rising from the cracks of Iran’s journalistic society.” The solution he proposed — no doubt with the blessing of the supreme leader — was to “cut off heads and tongues” in order to silence any form of free and open discussion that did not suit the purposes of Khamenei and his cronies.

I responded to his comments by publishing a short article in Jame-e. I wrote that I did not recall Safavi being one of the Revolutionary Guard’s founding members. I also wrote that when we created the Revolutionary Guard, we never envisioned it as a force standing against the ordinary people of Iran or in opposition to freedom of expression.

Immediately after the article was published, I was contacted by the supreme leader’s office and reprimanded for having written that I could not recall Safavi’s background with the Revolutionary Guard dating back to the corps’ founding.

Sometime afterward, Safavi made a political speech during the annual commemoration of the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran. I once again responded, this time in a radio interview. I stated that neither Safavi nor any other military commander had the right to comment on political matters, and that they must leave political matters entirely in the hands of the country’s civilian leadership. I also stated that if Safavi and any other military commanders nourished political ambitions, they were more than free to pursue them, but only once they had resigned their commissions and opted for civilian life.

In 2003, I was arrested and imprisoned by the secret intelligence unit run by the Revolutionary Guard under the supreme leader’s direct supervision. My radio comments about Safavi were among the six serious charges brought against me. My crime had been to insult a revolutionary organization, a crime punishable by imprisonment.

My experience was far from unique. Anyone seen as a competitor — political, commercial or otherwise — runs the risk of being put out of commission by intimidation and brute force. As a direct result, a number of Revolutionary Guard commanders have risen to key positions of power in Iran, despite being clearly unqualified.

Under their leadership, the Revolutionary Guard has extended its reach across Iranian society. Militarily and politically, it has carved out a role for itself not unlike that of the Red Army and the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. It has transformed itself, KGB-like, into a mafia that dominates Iran’s police force. And in its business activities, it now resembles some of the world’s major cartels.

And the Revolutionary Guard’s ambitions continue to grow. In order to sideline potential rivals, the Revolutionary Guard has been instrumental in inciting division between some of the country’s key agencies, such as the Supreme National Security Council and the Ministry of the Interior. With the backing of Khamenei, Revolutionary Guard commanders have done their very best to expand their influence over the legislative and judicial branches of government. And they have made every effort to consolidate support for their cronies in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in Iran’s radio and television networks.

Left unchecked, the Revolutionary Guard’s political and economic adventurism will inevitably lead to a serious crisis. The people of Iran will suffer the most, but so, too, will others in the Middle East. Last summer’s hostage-takings in Lebanon and Palestine, which culminated in the horrific 34-day war between Israel and Hezbollah, are only small examples of the kind of scenarios we are likely to face.

It is therefore imperative that the Iranian people, with the help of the international community, seriously attempt to roll back the powers of this growing monster. Unless the Revolutionary Guard is contained, it may soon face a groundswell of opposition — from within its own ranks, from others associated with the regime and, perhaps most importantly, from ordinary Iranian citizens. Unless the Revolutionary Guard curbs its incompetent and illegal involvement in the political and economic life of Iran, the rising tide of unrest is bound to reach a very dangerous climax.

Mohsen Sazegara co-founded the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in 1979, and served the Islamic Republic until 1989 in a number of senior government positions, including deputy prime minister for political affairs and managing director of the National Radio of Iran. He went into exile after being imprisoned in 2003, and is currently a visiting researcher at Harvard University.
Fri. Mar 16, 2007

The sixth issue of Gozaar focuses on the Constitution and rule of law in Iran. We posed the following questions to Mohsen Sazegara, Mehrdad Mashayekhi, and Hormoz Hekmat:

• What possible and/or probable means exist for changing or amending the Islamic Republic's Constitution?
• Is it necessary (and possible) to change the Constitution through the legal mechanisms outlined in the Constitution itself?
• Is a public referendum an appropriate way to bring about constitutional reform?
• What solution(s) would you offer?

Mr. Sazegara's answers appear below:

Article 177 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran lays out the possibility of revising the Constitution, but the form and content of this revision can only be determined by the Supreme Leader. “The Leader issues a decree to the President after consultation with the Nation’s Exigency Council stipulating the amendments or additions to be made by the Council for Revision of the constitution which consists of…”

Most members of this council are the members of the Council of Guardians, the heads of the three branches of government, and the permanent members of the Nation’s Exigency Council. Ten members are also selected by the Supreme Leader. This composition clearly points to the fact that the Council for Revision of the Constitution is controlled by the Supreme Leader, although any decisions after being approved by the Supreme Leader have to be endorsed in a national referendum. In any case, the decision to introduce a change in the Constitution, the stages of realizing this change, and its final form are all subject to the whims of the Supreme Leader. The principal problem with the Constitution is the unlimited powers of the Supreme Leader who cannot be held accountable for his actions. In fact, the Constitution has legitimized the tyranny of one person in the name of Leadership. There is no way to reform or improve the Constitution because the Supreme Leader can curb, influence, and dictate all the possible changes within it.

The only way to change the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran lies outside this Constitution. It can only materialize through intense pressure from Iranians inside the country, aided by the international community. This pressure should be so strong that it forces the Supreme Leader into retreat and compels him to submit to people’s demands for Constitutional reform.

Perhaps we can readily claim that the only democratic and non-violent solution to the present situation is the change of the Constitution. But we should keep in mind that the Supreme Leader will not simply submit to any demand, advice, request, or solicitation for change. He will retreat only under the pressure generated by civil disobedience and the mobilization of various segments of society. Civil disobedience includes a vast range of actions that extend from street demonstrations to seminars and sit-ins, from graffiti on the walls to slowing traffic and blackouts. Around 200 forms of civil disobedience have been surveyed and studied to date. Similarly, the pressure of the international community on the Iranian regime can also be effective, provided it is in concert with the demands of the people inside Iran.

I support the mobilization of various groups and segments of society in actions of civil disobedience. These actions should stress short and long-term demands, but they should mainly focus on obtaining a true referendum on the current Constitution under the supervision of international observers. I believe that only civil and non-violent strategies must be used to achieve this objective. Detailing this view is, of course, beyond the scope of a short debate; thus, we should defer this elaboration to another occasion.

Larijani was also quoted by Iran's Fars news agency as saying that the Democrats' victory could however potentially "strengthen Europe's role in negotiations with the Islamic Republic."

Bush's Republican administration has so far put pressure on Western powers within the United Nations to approve sanctions against Tehran over its atomic programme which world powers fear is aimed at building nuclear weapons. Iran has repeatedly ignored calls to halt sensitive nuclear work, claiming it is solely for civilian use.

According to Mohsen Sazegara, the founder of the Iranian revolutionary guards corps, the Pasdaran, "the position of the Democrats on the Iranian nuclear issue is not so distant as that of the current administration."

"We should not forget that US Democrats have strongly condemned the statements of (Iranian president) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Israel,and on the issue of sanctions against Iran are even more determined than the Republicans who have many economic interests in the Gulf area," he added.

Centre for Middle Eastern Studies of Rutgers University director Houshang Amir Ahmadi said he believes both US coalitions will "converge towards the centre," and moderate their positions after the mid-term election results. "There is no great difference between the two parties on foreign policy issues such as human rights, weapons of mass destruction, Iran's nuclear programme, terrorism and national security, on which their policies in fact converge," he added. "It's the different methods used to confront these issues that make the difference between Republicans and Democrats."

Ayatollah Mohajerani, the minister of culture and Islamic orientation under the first presidency of Mohammad Khatami, has welcomed the results and says he is "happy about the victory of the Democrats and the defeat of George Bush."

"These elections will oblige the current administration to act more carefully in the last two years of the presidential mandate and reduces the threat of a US military strike against the Islamic Republic."

(Rah/Aki)
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Politics&loid=8.0.358415783&par=0

Mohammad Tahavori

Confronting the international community and combating internal strife has left Iran in a precarious position, where it must be prepared for any type of offensive action. This issue was clearly discernable from the comments made by Ali Khamenei, the country’s Supreme Leader, on Wednesday, September 20. In his comments, Khamenei emphasized the military’s ability to defend the country. But are the military’s capabilities sufficient to maintain the country’s security when faced with foreign aggression?  The response to this question from the perspective of military leaders - who have assumed ultimate power within the country and who believe they can protect it from harm by destroying opponents – is a positive one. However, the complex history of Iran has proven that the opposite is true.

Foreign penetration of Iranian civil society and ethnic communities and the role of foreign entities in encouraging separatists’ demands may seem like a good reason to suppress the rights of ethnic and civil groups. The truth is, however, that these tools do not increase the government’s ability to repress such urges and only decrease the patience and tolerance with which these groups and communities tolerate the government. 

Suppression of the press, national and regional, and the detention of civil activists within Iran in an attempt to impede efforts towards independence and separation have enabled a migration towards a single voice within the country. Yet, when viewed from a broader standpoint, this type of suppression has placed the entire nation under the same militaristic ideology, which has not yielded uniform results throughout the nation or outside the country’s borders.

The possibility of secession and the activities of activists and politicians, who seek to maintain territorial unity, is the basis of a conversation with Mohsen Sazegara, a political activist and researcher at Harvard University in the United States.

Mohammad Tahavori: The continued political, social, and cultural efforts by ethnic groups and the increasing power of civil activists within Iran, though much needed to protect the civil rights of ethnic minorities, has been countered by two hypotheses from politicians: first, there is the belief that foreign and domestic influences will use the rampant dissatisfaction with the government to promote separationism in Iran and the establishment of new regional governments that can diversify power in the country.  Second is the belief that, by building on the strength and potential of ethnic populations residing in and around the country, those promoting rebellion against Iran’s central government can force a change in the regime’s attitude or the regime itself. These groups, however, are not seeking separation to form independent governments.  Which hypothesis do you consider to be closer to the reality in Iran and why?  Is there a third hypothesis you would consider?

Mohsen Sazegara:  Before I talk about my thoughts regarding the various ethnic groups in Iran, allow me to point out a few things that will further clarify my thoughts. The first is that Iran is a country with a multitude of ethnic groups and religions.  The history of Iran has shown that Iranians have, even after incidents of separation and strife, come together and united as one. This point was first defined by an expert on the Middle East and it means that, based on this specific characteristic, separation from Iran will not be easy. Secondly, in this day and age where globalization is paramount, the traditional roles and powers of states have changed. This has been happening since the early 1900s.  Today, people, organizations, and companies are considered to be multi-national and as such, the time when new nations can be developed has come to an end. Should such an event ever come to fruition, there will be significant civil and cultural conflicts. The independence achieved by the former Yugoslavian states was the one exception in recent years, and that was under the strong influence of Germany.  So, it should be noted that the international community is not a proponent of establishing new nations and that globalization has replaced this concept. Therefore, multi-national organizations and companies have become the backbone of the world in which we live today.

The third point: I have heard personally from Hashemi Rafsanjani that Iran is a diverse country, that only the clergy can hold it together and that without the clergy, the country will fall apart. The shah thought the same way. The shah used to say: “Without me, there is no Iran. It will become a conglomerate of states.” But history has shown that the country did not fall apart without the shah and certainly, with the departure of the clergy, it will still maintain its unity. What has historically forced Iranian groups to seek secession has been the central government’s disloyalty, irresponsibility, and inefficiency toward its citizens.  It has been under circumstances of pressure and cruelty that various groups have had to depend on their ethnicity as a reliable source of support. At this time, as much as the regime has pressured the youth in Tehran, it has similarly pressured and agitated the Kurdish, Turkish, Arab, and Baluchi youth and has thus increased dissatisfaction among the people.

The last point is that, in my opinion, a democratic government and a government of the people for the people is the only way out of the current situation in Iran. We not only need to promote democracy amongst people and groups throughout the various regions of Iran, but we must emphasize this philosophy throughout Iranian society as well.  We must have regional parliaments and elective governorships in place, and the ability to place the power and decision-making processes with the people in each region.

In saying this, do you support Iran becoming a federation of states?

Definitely. Though the word federalism may not have much meaning in Iran – simply because Iran has never been a federation – we can still develop this concept of our own accord. The more we work on increasing regional authority, the more we help with the establishment of democracy in Iran. Politicians who support democracy should not be apprehensive about the impact of regional power.  These ethnic groups have certain social and cultural demands that are not only their right, but whose deprivation would constitute a form of oppression. Some of these demands, such as teaching the mother tongue in schools, are part of the central government’s obligation to protect cultural heritage. Obviously, many of these demands take on political connotations and politicians will use their potential to promote their goals. But if the concept of the regionalization of power becomes known, then there should be no concern about the politicization of these ideals in the fight for democracy.

Now in response to your question, as far as I know, there are no plans in Washington, DC or London to promote secession in Iran. Washington and London are seeking peace in the world, which would allow them to promote economic growth and global investment, not increased conflict and strife.  Separating countries into newly independent states simply increases the amount of conflict and no country would support such a tactic unless it is in a country such as the former Yugoslavia, where the concept of independence was fully developed and ready for implementation.  The rumors about Iranian secession began at a seminar held by the American Enterprise Institute in Washington with Michael Ledeen. This gentleman is not taken seriously amongst journalists and cannot be the basis on which the White House makes its political decisions.  It is a mistake if we base our understanding of the White House’s plans on independent US organizations.  As a matter of fact, the White House is very concerned about additional conflict in the Middle East.

I even believe that the idea that there are foreign influences provoking ethnic and other groups to resist the regime is also incorrect and that such a strategy does not exist.  The best example is the current unrest in the province of Khuzestan.  When the British accused Iran of promoting unrest in Basra, Iraq, there was similar unrest in Ahwaz and Iran similarly charged the United Kingdom with instigating these unrests.  Of course, these countries do constantly launch accusations at one another, but they tend to be circumstantial in nature and not strategic. We should also remember that when there is conflict between two countries, each country will make certain allegations against the other. In a conflict, anything is possible.  Politicians should not be afraid of threats and accusations, but should instead focus on the issues and ideas that can help promote and ensure democracy in Iran.

But the concept of a larger Middle East is not something that has been promoted by reporters and think tanks. The US State Department, through the Secretary of State and the Department’s spokesperson, has discussed this on numerous occasions.  They have said that, in their plans for a new Middle East, new governments with Kurdish, Baluchi, and Shiite Arab ethnicities… will be seen.

I think that the plans for a larger Middle East or a newer Middle East center more on democratization and not on changing borders. They have focused on the changing world of Islam and how its evolving ideals are impacting the concept of globalization throughout the world. The plans for the Middle East aim to resolve the relationship between Islam and the new world, a world where citizens have equal rights. Yet, the State Department has no specific plan for this.  The theory you discuss has been developed and promoted by Iranian government officials, but it has not been taken seriously in Washington DC.

Regardless of how seriously secession is seen in Iran itself, it seems that in neighboring countries, the situation in Kurdistan is considered important. In Iraqi President Barzani’s recent visit to Kurdistan, we saw the Iraqi Kurds replace the Iraqi flag with that of Kurdistan. In Turkey there is continued conflict between the Kurds and the government. Do you not think that, to end the current conflicts in these regions, Kurdish independence will one day become a reality?

Kurdistan is an exception among Iran’s ethnic groups. Kurdistan is the only ethnic group that is divided between four countries – Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria.  In Iranian Azerbaijan, there are occasional rumors of it merging with independent Azerbaijan, but the Turks in Iran have never been anxious to separate, as their identity is fully merged with that of the Iranian nation.  Other ethnic groups are in a similar position.  There is no doubt that in certain parts of Kurdistan, the idea of an independent Kurdistan is appealing to a group of activists; however, I have participated in presentations and talks by Kurdish authorities and have been involved in discussions with Kurdish students and intellectuals, yet I have never heard nor seen them support secession from Iran.  On the contrary, I believe that they, like the intellectuals in Tehran, think about globalization, about maintaining their rights, and about living alongside other ethnic groups while maintaining their culture and heritage.

However, there seem to be alternative thought processes that give ethnic groups in Iran another option. Noam Chomsky, in an interview with Akbar Ganji on BBC, said “there is information that shows that the US government is promoting unrest in Iran’s Azerbaijan and the southern parts of Iran, especially Khuzestan, which has oil reserves. If they [the US Government] can form an independence-seeking group in Ahwaz, under the auspices of supporting secession from Iran, they will promote military interventions in the area.” Safar Hendi, Iran’s Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance, told a group of reporters in Azerbaijan, that “unfortunately, in a review of regional newspapers and publications, we found that eighty percent of them support secession from Iran and these ideas are being fully promoted by foreign organizations and entities.” On the other hand, Ardugan, the Turkish President, has brought up the idea of establishing a commonwealth of Turkic-speaking states. In these instances, there seems to be a focus on separation and secession, even if these plans do not have actual foreign support.

What is certain is that when there is undue pressure on people, there is increased dissatisfaction. In such instances you cannot separate a Fars, a Turk, or another citizen.  The youth in Tehran is as similarly dissatisfied as the youth from Sanandaj. Governments that use force promote the need for separation among their citizens. The young man who is a Fars would look for a way to leave the country, while the young man from Sanandaj or Tabriz has the pretext of secession and uses it more effectively.  In this case, the British and the Americans might want to use this phenomenon as a tool for increased conflict with Iran.  How many people can you find in Iran who have the ability to leave and live in another country, but prefer to remain in Iran?  When there is an unclear view of the future, the desire to move away and separate becomes more forceful. What I am concluding is that while this need for separation may one day become more dominant, it is not a global plan backed by a goal-oriented strategy.  More importantly, fears of secession should not force those politicians seeking a democratic government to shy away from the issue of minorities. On the contrary, they should move closer to these entities and use them effectively to develop and implement democracy in the country.

This is a serious question. As you mentioned, if the government continues with its current strategies, the desire for secession among ethnic groups becomes heightened. In such a case, how can democracy-seeking groups in Iran use the territorial unity of the country to promote this concept?

If ever we reach such a point, the election process and the rule of the people is the solution.   The concept of a government for the people by the people must be promoted. Personally, though, I don’t think this will happen. In establishing a democracy, the concept of federalism will take precedence over that of secession. However, if what religious leaders have said is true and secession is being sought, then we must resort to the election process as the decisive instrument.  I don’t think that we should move away from the rule of the people. However, I do believe that if we move correctly, recognize the basic rights of the ethnic populations in Iran, and follow the route of globalization, this type of conversation becomes a moot point.

For the last question, if Iran ends up in another war, will this war increase the disparity between the government, the people and the ethnic populations, or, as a group of politicians and military leaders believe, will the inherent dissatisfaction increase their acceptance of the war?

I do not think that either scenario will happen.  If there is military conflict between Iran and the US, we must first find out what kind of conflict it is. If the conflict focuses solely on Iran’s nuclear weapons strategy, then the people will only be bystanders. But if the conflict, based on almost an impossible situation, is of the type in Afghanistan and Iraq, then again, I don’t think that the Iranian people will place themselves in danger and their reaction will be similar to that of the Iraqi people. They will neither protest against the US, nor will they stand behind the military under the rule of the Supreme Leader.  Under these circumstances, I don’t think we will see diversity in how the various ethnic groups in the country will react. In the history of Iran, we have had occasions where, because of the undue pressure posed by the sitting regime, people welcomed external influences. The time when people will accept oppression over colonialization or colonialization over oppression is a difficult one to foretell.
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