Azerbaijan, Baku, 24 February /corr. Trend News D.Khatinoglu / The UN Security Council’s passing a new resolution against Iran may present obstacles to Tehran’s co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). “ Iran may cease co-operation with the IAEA,” the US expert Mohsun Sazegara reported to Trend News.

On 22 February the IAEA Chairman Mohamed Al-Baredi submitted the report on Iran’s nuclear plans to the UN Security Council. The report highlights increase of Iran’s co-operation with the IAEA. The report says that Iran still refuses to make clear several key doubts. The permanent representatives of the UN Security Council devised the initial variant of the third Resolution against Tehran. Iranian officials stated that if any new sanctions are applied against the Country, they will sharply and seriously react to it.

The strong reaction of Iran can end its cooperation with IAEA and cause its refusal from Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Sazegara told Trend by telephone from Washington on 23 February. “The new Resolution of the UN Security Council will impose embargo to Iranian banks Melli and Saderat, the Iranian officials will be banned to visit other countries and the goods imported to Iran will not be insured by foreign companies and they will not be provided with a credit guarantee. The sanctions imposed to Iran up to now inflicted huge damages to the country. If Iran will not fulfill the UN Security Council demands, it is not excluded that an embargo will be imposed on Iran’s oil industry,” he added.

Sazegara noted that the benefits and losses of Iran from nuclear plan are incomparable. “Irrespective of the statements made by the Country’s officials, there is uncertainty on the nuclear plan. The international community is seriously concerned by Iran’s continuing ballistic missile tests, threats of wiping Israel off the face of the earth and installation of new centrifuge on the nuclear station Natants,” Sazegara said.

Al-Baredi’s report on the Iranian nuclear program was positively assessed by the Iranian officials. “Golamhossein Elham, an Iranian official, positively treated IAEA’s recent report and noted that the peaceful purposes of Iran’s nuclear plan have again been confirmed,” IRNA quoted on 23 February. On the other hand, BBC cited the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice who stated that Al-Baredi’s report reflected the danger of Iran’s secret nuclear program. In his report Al-Baredi noted that he was not completely certain about the peaceful purposes of the Iranian nuclear plan, but at the same time, he said that the official Teheran intensified its cooperation with IAEA.

http://news.trend.az/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1142726&lang=EN

Azerbaijan, Baku, 10 January / core Trend D.Khatinoglu / Despite the demands by the UN Security Council, Iran has not yet ceased the enrichment of uranium and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) head’s visit to Tehran will be directed towards the resolution of this issue. The IAEA Secretary General’s visit to Iran is the last ultimatum for Tehran, Mohsen Sazegara, a US expert, stated in an interview for Trend.

On 12 Jan, Mohammad Albaradei, the Secretary General of the IAEA, will visit Iran. The UN Security Council demand Iran to halt the enrichment of uranium. In this respect, the two resolutions have been issued to Iran, but Iran did not stop its nuclear plan. Although 5+1 countries failed to come to a common ground, they are discussing the application of the third resolution with respect to Iran.

On 10 Jan, Sazegara stated in his telephonic interview for Trend from Washington that the Iranian nuclear program excited concerns both in the West and Arab countries. Over the last period, the United States gently treated Iran and it has excited concern in the United Arab Emirates, which fears that the United States might make any compromises for the nuclear issue and that might contradict Arabs’ interests. “The US President’s visit to the region targets promising Arabs, their security,” he said.

Sazegari said that the United States will not make any comprise with respect to Iran. “The United States will still try to apply the third resolution with respect to Iran and Albaradei’s visit to Iran is the last warning for this country,” Sazegara said.

The UN Security Council demanded Iran to cease the enrichment of uranium. However, Tehran still insists on its nuclear plan and considers the enrichment of uranium as its juridical right. So far, the UN Security Council has issued the two resolutions on Iran and at present the third resolution under the discussion.

Same interview in Russian and Azeri:
http://news.trend.az/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1109515&lang=RU
http://news.trend.az/index.shtml?show=news&newsid=1109512&lang=AZ

WASHINGTON (AFP) - The United States risks elevating tensions and is not likely to achieve much by declaring Iran's Revolutionary Guards a "terrorist" group, a prominent Iranian dissident who co-founded the Guards said.

Mohsen Sazegara, who was a high-ranking Tehran official before turning against the government, told AFP in an interview that the US move, reported to be in the works last week, could spark a backlash, stirring up more turmoil in places where Washington accuses them of terror activities, including Iraq, Afghanistan and Lebanon.

Now a research fellow on Iran at Harvard University, Sazegara also said that he doubted blacklisting the Revolutionary Guards would force any change in the regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

"The relationship between Iran and the United States will go one more step ahead toward military confrontation and the situation will become more dangerous, because the Revolutionary Guards is now one of the most powerful organizations in the politics of Iran," he said.

Sazegara, 52, is in a unique position to know about the secretive group he describes as the most powerful institution in Iran.

He held high positions in the Tehran regime after the 1979 revolution, including a key role in setting up the Revolutionary Guards that year. He describes it as now a huge political force of its own.

"The Revolutionary Guard ... is at the same time a political party, it is like an army, a security organization, a secret service, a huge complex of companies."

Domestically, he said, they operate a militia, the Bassidj, for suppression. Outside the country, they operate through the Quds force, which is out of Ahmadinejad's control.

"This is a force that is involved in Iraq, or Lebanon, or Afghanistan, or Palestine, any place in the world," he said.

"Not only the foreign ministry of Iran; even the president does not know what the Revolutionary Guards does outside of Iran. They directly report to the leader," he said, referring to Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

He described the group as having built sweeping economic power since the 1990s. "They started to run several companies and right now many people believe that the Revolutionary Guards own more than 100 companies .... in general contracts of gas and oil, plants, extraction projects.

Under Khamenei, they pushed deeply into politics, playing a key role in Ahmadinejad's rise.

"Many of the members of cabinet and parliament are members of the Revolutionary Guards ... many of the top managers of the country are from the Revolutionary Guards."

Sazegara, who distanced himself from the government in 1989 and did four stints in jail for his activities as editor of a reformist journal, said there is room for some pressure on Iran.

"It's hard to say what is the main intention of the United States," he said, noting that a minority of the US leadership, including Vice President Dick Cheney, have threatened a military strike on the country.

"So far although we have had two resolutions of the UN Security Council, they are not strong resolutions, they don't go for the main sources of power of this regime.

"Whatever the United States has done solely is more effective. Striking the banking system is causing a lot of problems for the merchants and industries of Iran, in the private and public sectors."

However, he insisted, "blacklisting the Revolutionary Guards is not enough to push them to a reasonable policy."

"Everything must be solved by negotiations. But in any negotiation you have to show your power too. You have to show the carrots and the sticks, you have to show that you are serious too. Otherwise Iran just wastes time."

Sazegara, who left Iran and went to Harvard in 2005, said that the Guards themselves are not all that content with Ahmadinejad, and that international pressure over human rights could have an impact on his government.

"What (Iranians) expect from the international community is to put pressure on this regime to help the people of Iran in their struggle for democracy and human rights.

"Any sanction against Iran of course creates problems for the people. But the people of Iran are ready to tolerate the difficulties if they are sure that the international community goes toward a kind of Helsinki process, if they establish some link between the sanctions and the human rights and democratic issues in Iran."

By Philip Sherwell Aug 19, 2007

As the zealous enforcers of Iran's Islamic revolution, they are at pains to be seen living humbly, maintaining homes in the crumbling Soviet-style slums of downtown Teheran and driving modest, imported Korean cars.

But for many commanders of the Revolutionary Guards, the force allegedly responsible for ordering attacks on British and US forces in Iraq, life is rather more luxurious than they want it to appear.

Behind the façade of a simple, pious existence, they live in mansions in the exclusive hills of northern Teheran with the latest model of BMW or Mercedes Benz in the garage, luxury hand-woven rugs on the floor, wardrobes full of designer clothes and a safe packed with diamond and gold jewellery.

Such men have grown rich as the Guards have extended their role from imposing religious rectitude at home and exporting Iran's revolution, to playing a huge role in the country's economy. From the oil and gas industries to chicken farms and apiaries, the Guards have used their power and muscle to take control of major areas of business in Iran.

Now, though, their burgeoning economic empire is the focus of White House moves to classify the regime's 125,000-strong praetorian Guard as a "terrorist organisation".

Under plans disclosed last week, the Bush administration is expected to announce the classification in coming months in response to the Guards' alleged role in terror attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in Iran's disputed nuclear programme.

The listing would allow the US to freeze or block bank accounts and business involved with the Guards, although the immediate impact would be limited as the US already has an almost complete trade embargo on Iran. But the designation could be more than symbolic if US diplomats can encourage European states and companies to follow suit by persuading them that trade with Iran is effectively trade with the Guards.
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General Yahya Rahim Safavi, the leader of the Guards, responded defiantly yesterday. "America will receive a heavier punch from the Guards in the future," he said. "We will never remain silent in the face of US pressure and we will use our leverage against them."

Under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, himself a former Guards commander, the organisation has aggressively expanded its business empire as part of his strategy of placing hardliners in key positions of power.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran, the exile opposition movement which revealed the existence of Iran's secret nuclear programme in 2002, has tracked the explosion of the Guards' economic operations. "The country's economy and politics is now under the command of veteran Guards commanders and senior officials of the security and intelligence apparatus," it concludes in a dossier on the Guards' activities.

Maryam Rajavi, the leader of the council, which Iran itself regards as a terrorist organisation, said: "The designation of the Guards will have been long overdue. The UK and EU should adopt similar measures without delay."

Teheran would doubtless counter that the council's armed wing is itself listed as a terror organisation by the US - the council's supporters claim that designation was made as a bargaining chip when the Clinton administration attempted rapprochement with Iran.

One former Guards commander to have benefited is Sadeq Mahsouli, 47, an Ahmadinejad confidant. He spent much of his career in the military and security apparatus before using his guards contacts and credentials to build a business in construction and oil trading.

Indeed, when he was nominated to be oil minister in 2005, his wealth even raised opposition in the parliament, where one legislator called him a "billionaire general". Mr Mahsouli acknowledged he was a rich man but was quoted by the state-run newspaper Hammiyan as saying: "What Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] has prohibited is the attitude and demeanour of living in palaces, not living in palaces itself."

They may not technically be palaces, but his six mansions and estates are estimated to be worth £10 million while his total worth could be as much as £86 million, according to Iranian media reports.

Several Iranian businessmen, speaking anonymously, have detailed how the Guards have used force and intimidation to grab business. "If you enter the economy using a gun and handcuffs, it is much easier to deal with competitors and to win the most lucrative contracts," said Mohsen Sazegara, who co-founded the organisation in 1979 but then turned against the regime and was jailed before going into exile in America in 2003.

He claimed the Guards had turned into a "corrupting" and "mafia-like" organisation, which was heavily involved in smuggling goods for the thriving black market. These include alcohol, which is supposedly forbidden but is widely consumed at private parties frequented by the Iranian elite. Much of the smuggling is done through Guards-controlled airports.

Even as Teheran suffers an economic slump, which is undermining Mr Ahmadinejad's popularity, jewellery boutiques and luxury furniture are doing a booming trade thanks partly to patronage from the Guards, who have also been investing heavily in property.

The real "fat cats", however, are funnelling their money abroad into the Gulf states, most notably Dubai. Such investment could also provide a foreign bolthole if the regime falters in the future.

By Ruth Walker
Special to Harvard News Office

Iranian rights activist and HLS fellow Mohsen Sazegara (above right): ‘[T]here is no way to have human rights ... unless you come out and redefine the human being, and accept modern rationality and modern reason.’ Fellow Mehrangiz Kar (above left) listens.
Staff file photo Stephanie Mitchell/Harvard News Office

“Iran has a constitution and specific laws that on closer scrutiny turn out not to be laws at all, because they can be interpreted in any way to the advantage of the rulers.”

That is the judgment on his homeland that Mohsen Sazegara, Iranian human rights activist and now a fellow at Harvard Law School, presented Friday (April 27).

He went on, “The rulers can undertake any transgression against the rights of citizens and against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the guise of upholding the law.”

Sazegara spoke at a conference sponsored by the University Committee on Human Rights Studies to explore the current state of human rights in Iran. He and other presenters gave a very dark picture. It wasn’t without some significant silver linings, though — even at a time of heightened tensions between Washington and Tehran that put activists within Iran in a precarious position.

Sazegara also articulated what Stephen Marks, Francois-Xavier Bagnoud Professor of Health and Human Rights in the Faculty of Public Health and the organizer of the conference, called “the profound issue of the fundamental incompatibility of Islam, as interpreted by the Islamic Republic, and human rights.”

To make Islamic law compatible with international human rights would take nothing less than “redefining what it means to be human,” asserted Sazegara, who initially supported the Islamic revolution but soon became disillusioned and who has spent several years in prison as a result.

In an Islamic state, he said, “there is no way to have human rights, a standard of human rights, unless you come out and redefine the human being, and accept modern rationality and modern reason, and then you will have another sharia.”

This isn’t a problem only in Iran, Sazegara said. The new constitutions in Iraq and Afghanistan, he noted pointedly, insist that no law can be made in conflict with Islamic law.

Without such a rethinking and a coming to terms with modernity, Sazegara said, Islamic law “means they have to execute anyone who converts his religion from Islam; they can’t have any equality for men and women; it means they have to stone everyone who commits adultery.”

Despite this grim analysis, several of the eight presenters identified grounds for hope and practical approaches to engaging the government for positive change.

Hadi Ghaemi of Human Rights Watch described several branches of Iranian civil society as fairly active — notably women’s rights organizations, writers’ and journalists’ organizations, and a resurgent labor movement.

The position of women is more advanced than a straight reading of the law would suggest, he said. And women are better off trying to redress specific grievances — under-representation in the universities, for instance, given that 65 percent of those who pass entrance exams are women — than defending “human rights” in the abstract.

Iran is a member of or signatory to a number of different international organizations or conventions, and several presenters suggested that these could provide useful channels.

Recent events in the Middle East have put the spotlight on Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Guard naval units seized 15 British service personnel in the waters of the Persian Gulf last month, and Revolutionary Guard agents have been accused of aiding insurgents and terrorist groups in Iraq and Lebanon. VOA correspondent Gary Thomas gives us a look at the Revolutionary Guard and its role inside and outside Iran.

According to Western analysts, the Revolutionary Guard (Pasdaran) runs businesses, maintains its own ground and sea forces separate from the regular army and navy, mounts foreign and domestic intelligence operations, and has become a major player on Iran's political landscape.

The Revolutionary Guard was born in the tumult surrounding the Islamic Revolution 28 years ago. Mohsen Sazegara, who accompanied Ayatollah Khomeini on his return to Iran in 1979, said the new revolutionary government did not entirely trust the regular armed forces, and also feared attack from the United States. So, Sazegara says, he was given the task of forming a kind of people's militia to protect the revolution.

"I remember, in those days, I studied the model of the National Guard of the United States, the Swiss Army, the peoples' army of Switzerland, and the army of Israel and the Viet Cong in Vietnam - the models of how we can mobilize the ordinary people to defend the country - in any case, to help the regular army of the country," he said.

After Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in 1980, poorly armed, but fiercely zealous Revolutionary Guard units threw themselves in the front lines of attack. In the years following, the Revolutionary Guard grew into a highly disciplined and deeply ideological military force. Many analysts estimate the guards number about 125,000 in air, land, sea and intelligence units.

Mohsen Sazegara left Iran in 2003, after being imprisoned for dissident views. He now lectures at Harvard University. He says the Revolutionary Guard's power has grown enormously, and it now dabbles in politics and gets lucrative business contracts from the government.

"Now, the Revolutionary Guard has been converted into a kind of organization, a kind of government inside the government of Iran,” he noted. “They are like the KGB, because they have a secret service, as well. They are like the Red Army, they are like the Communist Party, and they are like a complex of companies, as well."

The current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is a Guard veteran of the Iran-Iraq war. Some analysts attribute his 2005 election to active intercession by the Basiij, the nearly one-million-person strong domestic volunteer militia under Guard control. It is known for enforcing ideological purity. One analyst likens the Basiij to the Red Guard in the days of Mao Zedong's China.

But Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran analyst with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says Ahmadinejad's past ties with the Guard do not necessarily mean he controls it.

"The Revolutionary Guards are increasingly a very powerful force in Iran,” he explained. “They have tremendous economic interests and assets. They are very active on the political scene, and they are essentially running Iranian activities in Lebanon and Iraq. But Revolutionary Guards are under the constitutional authority of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei."

The Guard's foreign operations arm is known as the Quds force. U.S. Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, commander of multinational forces in Iraq, says Quds force agents provide training and arms, including deadly roadside bombs, to Iraqi insurgents to attack U.S. forces.

"I would say, though, it is clear that they continue to interfere, the Quds Force continues to attempt to interfere in Iraqi, in operations inside of Iraq,” he said. “We continue to intercept weapons. We know there's money that's flowing in from Iran to certain insurgent groups in Iraq, and we will continue to work through this."

In January, U.S. forces detained five Iranians in northern Iraq. The U.S. says they are Quds force operatives; Iran says they are diplomats. Many analysts believe the U.S. detention of the Iranians was at least one cause of the Iranian seizure of the British sailors.

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Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was once a member of his country's Revolutionary Guard, the force that recently captured 15 British sailors in the waters between Iran and Iraq.

Before announcing the Britons' release Wednesday, Ahmadinejad pinned a medal of bravery to the chest of the Revolutionary Guard commander who oversaw their capture.

Analyst Bruce Reidel was a CIA officer focused on Iran when the Revolutionary Guard established itself as a major force.

"The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was formed in May 1979, almost immediately after the revolution," Reidel said. "It was set up by the then Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini to be the guardian of the revolution."

Now associated with the Brookings Institutions Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Reidel says the ayatollah wanted protection against threats by Iran's regular army, loyal to the previous government, and foreign intelligence agencies, like the CIA.

"Iranian's had a vivid memory of 1953, when a coup had been launched against a much-less revolutionary government … and put the shah back in power," Reidel said. "I think you can effectively characterize them [the Revolutionary Guard] as the hardliners within the Islamic Republic."

Mohsen Sazegara helped found the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and says the group was originally intended to be a popular force like the Swiss army, the National Guard in the United States or Vietnam's Viet Cong.

"The Revolutionary Guard was supposed to be a people's army," Sazegara said. "It was supposed to mobilize the people of Iran in front of any foreign attacks to Iran."

In 1980, when Iran and Iraq went to war, the Revolutionary Guard acted as human waves in some of the toughest battles. Hundreds of thousands of fighters perished.

At the same time, the Guard began to export the ideals of the revolution throughout the Middle East. The Quds Brigade acted as its external affairs branch, helping set up Hezbollah and developing other ties with Shia extremist groups.

"The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, for more than 25 years, has been involved in shipping weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, including [the] missiles used against Israeli cities last summer," analyst Reidel said. "They've also been involved in shipping arms to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian occupied territories."

Former Revolutionary Guard leader Sazegara says he became disillusioned with the organization as they gained more power within Iran. What bothered him most, he says, was when the Revolutionary Guard turned its attention to making money.

"The Revolutionary Guard started to intervene in economic and financial affairs in Iran," Sazegara said. "And, gradually, they have established about 100 companies all around the country, in construction, in trading, in manufacturing

"And now, the Revolutionary Guard is something really strange. It's an organization which is like a political party because they have 80 seats in the parliament, they have more than half of the members of the cabinet. They are like the KGB because they have secret services, and the act like that. And they are like a cartel or trust."

Sazegara, now a visiting researcher at Harvard University, was imprisoned in Iran in 2003 for criticizing the government.

"You can call the Revolutionary Guard a kind of government inside the government of Iran," he said.

Mohsen Sazegara | Fri. Mar 16, 2007

Back in October 1978, none of us in exile with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini imagined that victory for the Islamic Revolution would be attained only a few months later. It was during those days in Neuf-le-Chateau that the notion of starting a “people’s army” first took hold, and expecting that our battle would be a long one, we took as models for our soon-to-be established army the forces in Algeria and Cuba.

But on February 1, 1979, we stepped off a plane from France into Tehran, and 10 days later we were in power. Suddenly we had a position to protect, and the model for our people’s army changed dramatically. It seemed more appropriate to emulate such forces as the Swiss Armed Forces, United States National Guard or Israel Defense Forces.

The thought was that if the Islamic Republic had two separate armies with independent command structures, the country could insulate itself against a coup. If ordinary citizens were given military training in preparation for combat, we believed, then any military commander would think twice before contemplating overthrowing the government.

In the three decades since, there has not been a coup. That people’s army, however, has grown into a multi-headed monster.

Today the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution — known in Farsi as the Sepah-e Pasdaran and in English as the Revolutionary Guard — is a mafia-like organization with a corrupting influence on Iran’s army, police, media, industries, judiciary and government. It is imperative that every effort now be made to contain the Revolutionary Guard’s powers, because its political and economic adventurism will ultimately lead to a serious crisis, not just in Iran but also across the Middle East.

Any attempt at rolling back the Revolutionary Guard’s power must begin with an understanding of how it has strayed from its original mission.

In the first phase of planning, we envisioned three separate circles on the organizational chart. The first consisted of a small but varied cadre of at most 500 people who were to be permanently employed by the Revolutionary Guard. All command and staff positions, including all the trained personnel destined for senior command in guerilla warfare, were to come from this quarter.

The second circle was to consist of another group of around 500,000 people who were to be recruited on a volunteer or part-time basis from the general public, with a designated mission to serve as commanders of “civilian guerilla groups.” The third and final circle would encompass as many people as possible from all walks of life — students, workers, bureaucrats, farmers and the like. It was envisioned that each volunteer would receive military training and subsequently be invited to participate in at least one prearranged military exercise each year.

Although computers were not commonly used in those days, we nonetheless intended to make full use of computerized programming for the promotion of the new organization, under the direct supervision of one of the personnel working for me. The light weapons held in the various armories were to be re-registered and distributed around the country. In case of an emergency, our thinking went, a simple volunteer from anywhere in the land could serve under the command of a part-time, fully trained group leader, who in turn would be part of a Revolutionary Guard division under the command of a full-time, fully trained commander with a mission to protect the country and the revolution.

As originally planned, the Revolutionary Guard was to be, quite literally, a people’s army — not, as it has become, a force separate from the general public, let alone opposed to it. In times of war, the Revolutionary Guard was seen as a force to fight alongside the regular military in the service of the country. In times of peace, it was to tend to its own affairs. In times of need or natural disasters, it was to help out with civil defense and other emergency operations.

After the original plans for the Revolutionary Guard had been drawn up and its constitution finalized in April 1979, I relinquished my post in the organization’s information and research unit to Ali Mohammad Besharati. I moved on to National Iranian Radio and Television, where after a short while I was appointed to head radio operations.

The years since have taken me on a far different path than the one on which I began the Islamic Revolution, but having been involved with the Revolutionary Guard at its birth, I have continuously followed its evolution. It is my view that over the course of the past 28 years, the Revolutionary Guard has deviated from its original mission in three important ways, in the process inflicting a series of irreparable damages to Iran.

The sixth issue of Gozaar focuses on the Constitution and rule of law in Iran. We posed the following questions to Mohsen Sazegara, Mehrdad Mashayekhi, and Hormoz Hekmat:

• What possible and/or probable means exist for changing or amending the Islamic Republic's Constitution?
• Is it necessary (and possible) to change the Constitution through the legal mechanisms outlined in the Constitution itself?
• Is a public referendum an appropriate way to bring about constitutional reform?
• What solution(s) would you offer?

Mr. Sazegara's answers appear below:

Article 177 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran lays out the possibility of revising the Constitution, but the form and content of this revision can only be determined by the Supreme Leader. “The Leader issues a decree to the President after consultation with the Nation’s Exigency Council stipulating the amendments or additions to be made by the Council for Revision of the constitution which consists of…”

Most members of this council are the members of the Council of Guardians, the heads of the three branches of government, and the permanent members of the Nation’s Exigency Council. Ten members are also selected by the Supreme Leader. This composition clearly points to the fact that the Council for Revision of the Constitution is controlled by the Supreme Leader, although any decisions after being approved by the Supreme Leader have to be endorsed in a national referendum. In any case, the decision to introduce a change in the Constitution, the stages of realizing this change, and its final form are all subject to the whims of the Supreme Leader. The principal problem with the Constitution is the unlimited powers of the Supreme Leader who cannot be held accountable for his actions. In fact, the Constitution has legitimized the tyranny of one person in the name of Leadership. There is no way to reform or improve the Constitution because the Supreme Leader can curb, influence, and dictate all the possible changes within it.

The only way to change the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran lies outside this Constitution. It can only materialize through intense pressure from Iranians inside the country, aided by the international community. This pressure should be so strong that it forces the Supreme Leader into retreat and compels him to submit to people’s demands for Constitutional reform.

Perhaps we can readily claim that the only democratic and non-violent solution to the present situation is the change of the Constitution. But we should keep in mind that the Supreme Leader will not simply submit to any demand, advice, request, or solicitation for change. He will retreat only under the pressure generated by civil disobedience and the mobilization of various segments of society. Civil disobedience includes a vast range of actions that extend from street demonstrations to seminars and sit-ins, from graffiti on the walls to slowing traffic and blackouts. Around 200 forms of civil disobedience have been surveyed and studied to date. Similarly, the pressure of the international community on the Iranian regime can also be effective, provided it is in concert with the demands of the people inside Iran.

I support the mobilization of various groups and segments of society in actions of civil disobedience. These actions should stress short and long-term demands, but they should mainly focus on obtaining a true referendum on the current Constitution under the supervision of international observers. I believe that only civil and non-violent strategies must be used to achieve this objective. Detailing this view is, of course, beyond the scope of a short debate; thus, we should defer this elaboration to another occasion.

Mohammad Tahavori

Confronting the international community and combating internal strife has left Iran in a precarious position, where it must be prepared for any type of offensive action. This issue was clearly discernable from the comments made by Ali Khamenei, the country’s Supreme Leader, on Wednesday, September 20. In his comments, Khamenei emphasized the military’s ability to defend the country. But are the military’s capabilities sufficient to maintain the country’s security when faced with foreign aggression?  The response to this question from the perspective of military leaders - who have assumed ultimate power within the country and who believe they can protect it from harm by destroying opponents – is a positive one. However, the complex history of Iran has proven that the opposite is true.